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Abstract: 
The objective of this paper is to study and try to understand the main causes that 
determine innovative duality in the Argentine tradable sector with a radically different 
approach. First, it will not employ econometrics to find out innovation’s 
macroeconomic and microeconomic main obstacles, picking the latter up from 
published studies and, fundamentally, from Innovation Surveys. Secondly, this paper 
will analyze how the most innovative dynamic local sectors have surpassed mentioned 
hurdles, scheme in which the different farming activities’ experiences shall become 
significantly illuminating. Consequently, this methodology will sacrifice econometric 
robustness in order to gain, hopefully, explanatory richness. 
This study’s main result states that least innovative activities, like (medium)high-tech 
industrial branches and apple and beef productions, have had neither the size nor the 
articulation with other agents necessary to surpass macro and micro barriers. In this 
regard, successful studied local experiences reveal that a strategy to increase innovation 
in the former should have two components. On the one side, a macroeconomic context 
that affects favorably Argentine tradable firm’s profit margins constitutes a necessary 
(although not sufficient) condition for a strong innovative dynamics in mentioned firms. 
On the other side, the study of the soybean case, in particular, and other successful 
innovative activities, in general, provide evidence regarding microeconomics factors 
required to complement macroeconomics in order to boost innovative investment within 
domestic agriculture and industry. Specifically, the former reveal that innovation is 
usually not an individual behavior’s result, but a collective processes’ consequence. In 
studied experiences, the own agents’ (farmers, suppliers, clients and private 
organizations) coordination was enough to promote innovation. Contrarily, in 
(medium)high-tech manufacturing activities and beef and apple production, firms have 
not been able to surpass obstacles by themselves and, therefore, State’s presence 
becomes imperative to tackle the most severe innovative restrictions. 
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At a first glance, international comparisons reveal that innovation investment is 
relatively weak in Argentina. On that matter (Table I.1), the share of national Research 
and Development expenditure in local GDP was smaller than 0,5% in 2006, percentage 
that was not only inferior to the figures of developed nations like Japan (3,3% in 2005), 
the United States (2,6% in 2006) and Germany (2,5% in 2004) but, also, to the rates of 
emergent economies like Brazil (0,9% in 2004), Chile (0,7% in 2004) and China (1,3% 
in 2005). Besides, in the mentioned year, the Argentine private sector was only 
responsible for 30% of total domestic R+D disbursement, behavior that notoriously 
contrasted with the ones observed in both OCDE countries and the rest of the main 
Latin American nations. 
TABLE I.1. 
R+D EXPENDITURE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. VARIOUS YEARS. 
As a share of respective GDP: 
Country Year Share
Japan 2005 3,33%











Argentina 2006 0,49%  
Source: Based on data from OCDE and RICYT. 
The previous overview is reinforced when the amount of R+D expenditure per 
researcher is analyzed. Argentina invested us$30.000 per capita in 2006, figure that only 
surpassed the Chinese outlay, while it was considerably lower to the disbursement 
carried out not only by the United States, France and Japan but, also, by Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico (Table I.2). 




R+D EXPENDITURE PER RESEARCHER IN SELECTED COUNTRIES. 
VARIOUS YEARS. 












China 2005 22.337  
Source: Based on data from OCDE and RICYT. 
Finally, another usually utilized indicator regarding innovation intensity resides in the 
number of annual requests of patents. On this subject, whereas Japan and the United 
States demand more than 400.000 patents per year, Argentina only requested the 
granting of 4.959 in 2004 (Bisang and Stubrin, 2006). The national figure was more 
than quadrupled by Australia (23.500), more than tripled by Brazil (17.700) and more 
than duplicated by Mexico (12.200), while it narrowly surpassed the Chilean level 
(3.000). 
The previous international comparison on innovation has two limitations. First, the 
weak Argentine R+D expenditure is a result of an innovation pattern based on the 
acquisition of incorporated (especially in machinery and equipment) knowledge. In this 
respect, domestic industry destines the bulk of its innovative investment (54% in 2004) 
to the purchase of machineries and equipment (Figure I.1), behavior associated with 
agents whose technological development is sustained by exogenous sources and, thus, 
act as followers of the knowledge developed by (usually foreign) competitors and 
providers (Peirano, 2006). This strategy, shared by Brazil (81% in 2004) and Portugal 
(69% in 2000), reveals an innovative dynamics that fails to take advantage of internal 
sources of knowledge creation like R+D (Lugones et al, 2005). On the contrary, Dutch 
and, to a lesser extent, German manufacturing firms mainly allocate their innovation 
budget to R+D activities. In both cases, said agents are not only over the international 
technological frontier but, frequently, are responsible for expanding the global state of 
the art. 




MANUFACTURING FIRMS’ INNOVATIVE EXPENDITURE’S 
COMPOSITION. 2000. 
As a share of total innovative expenditure: 









R+D Machinery and Equipment  
(*) Brazilian data is from 2003. 
(**) Argentine data is from 2004. 
Source: Based on data from Indec (2006), IBGE (2005) and Eurostat (2004). 
Besides, comparatively low R+D expenditure in Argentina is partially a result of a 
productive configuration in which high-tech activities (e.g. machinery, transport 
equipment and precision instruments’ manufacturing) have a notoriously smaller 
incidence than in developed nations (Chudnovsky et al, 2006). Nevertheless, only 32% 
of the difference between Brazilian and Argentine industrial R+D investments in 2001 
and 2000, respectively, was explained by diversity regarding manufacturing structures 
between both countries, whereas the remaining 68% was based on asymmetrical 
expenditures within each activity (Sánchez et al, 2006). 
In second place, as Section II will illustrate, the previous analysis ignores that, although 
a vast fraction of Argentine tradable activities are notoriously below international 
standards on said subject, a few local key sectors in terms of their share in domestic 
GDP, exports (Figure I.3) and fiscal revenues were able to adopt state of the art 
technologies and, exceptionally, expand the global knowledge frontier. Amongst the 
latter, the majority of national agriculture1 (including oilseeds, cereals and some fruits) 
adopted considerably fast the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and other 
technologies, while the domestic pharmaceutical industry has achieved relevant world-
wide improvements (linked to biotechnology) and the local automotive2, petrochemical, 
steel, raw aluminum, paper and food and beverage industries have reached the 
international knowledge frontier. 
                                                          
1 In 2007, the agriculture sector generated 5% of Argentine GDP and 6% of national Government’s fiscal 
revenues (through export-duties). 
2 In 2007, the automotive industry contributed with 3% of Argentine GDP. 




MAIN ARGENTINE EXPORTING COMPLEXES*. 2006. 
In us$ million and as a share of total exports: 
Activity Millions of us$ Share
Total exports 46.456 100,0
Main complexes 37.576 80,9
          Oilseed complex 9.953 21,4
               Soybean 8.926 19,2
               Sunflower 811 1,7
               Others 216 0,5
          Oil - Petrochemical Complex 8.609 18,5
                Oil and gas 6.633 14,3
                Petrochemical 1.976 4,3
          Auomotive complex 4.654 10,0
          Cereal complex 3.291 7,1
                 Maize 1.298 2,8
                 Wheat 1.677 3,6
                 Rice 136 0,3
               Others 181 0,4
          Cattle complex 3.125 6,7
                 Beef 1.358 2,9
                 Leather 997 2,1
                 Dairy products 771 1,7
          Steel complex 1.764 3,8
          Fruit and horticulture complex 1.583 3,4
                 Fruit 1.114 2,4
                 Vegetables 469 1,0
           Copper complex 1.345 2,9
           Fishing complex 1.250 2,7
           Forestry complex 925 2,0
                  Paper 498 1,1
                   Wood 319 0,7
                   Others 109 0,2
           Grape complex 613 1,3
           Aluminum complex 465 1,0
Rest of exports 8.880 19,1  
* Each complex includes the main product and related goods (derivatives and, in some 
cases like the automotive, inputs). 
Source: Based on data from Indec. 
Precisely, the objective of this paper is to study and try to understand the main causes 
that determine this innovative duality in the Argentine tradable sector, which is not only 
assessed in the broad comparison between local agriculture and industry ("between"), 
but that also is noticed to the interior of both activities ("within"). To achieve its 
purpose, different sources of information on the subject will be utilized and processed, 
such as National Innovation Surveys and international databases. 
Surprisingly, Argentine published studies3 on this subject only utilize firm’s belonging 
to a certain industrial sector as a determinant (alongside other variables as size, 
macroeconomic volatility and capital origin) of its innovative propensity/expenditure. 
Therefore, the former are usually able to observe duality’s existence but can not assess 
its particular causes. Besides, said papers do not take into account some relevant 
barriers for innovation that are detected by the Surveys (as credit rationing and 
innovation’s costs, risks and return period) and that have different weights for diverse 
domestic sectors. Finally, those studies limit themselves to study industry, excluding 
farming activities which, especially in soybean and cereal’s case, have showed a 
significant innovative dynamics in the last years. 
                                                          
3 For a complete survey see Anlló et al (2008). 
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Due to the above, in Section III, this paper will explore Argentine innovative duality’s 
main determinants with a radically different approach. First, it will not employ 
econometrics to find out innovation’s main determinants, picking the latter up from 
published studies and, fundamentally, from Innovation Surveys. Secondly, this paper 
will analyze how the most innovative dynamic local sectors have surpassed mentioned 
obstacles, scheme in which the different farming activities’ experiences shall become 
significantly illuminating. Consequently, this methodology will sacrifice econometric 
robustness in order to gain, hopefully, explanatory richness. 
Last, but not least, it is important to emphasize that this paper is framed within the 
evolutionary school. Therefore, it does not suppose that Argentine firms’ innovative 
strategies are derived from maximizing behaviors, as the neoclassic theory of growth 
would state (Solow, 1957), but that the former are a result of selection processes in 
which historical and institutional factors, incomplete information and uncertainty 
acquire a crucial role (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991; Katz, 2000). 
 
II. MEASURING ARGENTINE INNOVATIVE DUALITY: 
The international comparison regarding industrial companies’ innovation expenditure’s 
intensity (measured as the quotient between said investment and respective sales) is 
remarkably adverse for our country (Figure II.1). On that matter, Argentine 
manufacturing firms’ innovation outlay reached only 1,1% of sales in 2004, which was 
ostensibly inferior to the percentage of European nations (e.g., in 2000, Belgium and 
Germany spent 5,5% and 5,3%, respectively) and, even, of Brazilian firms (2,5% in 
2003). 
FIGURE II.1. 
INNOVATION EXPENDITURE OF INDUSTRIAL FIRMS IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES. 2000. 








Belgium Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Brazil (**) Argentina (*)  
(*) Brazilian data is from 2003. 
(**) Argentine data is from 2004. 
Source: Based on data from Indec (2006), IBGE (2005) and Eurostat (2004). 
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The previous graph showed that local manufacturing companies carry out a 
comparatively small innovation investment. Consequently, their convergence to the 
international state of the art becomes relatively slow. Even, in some cases, since the 
global technological frontier expands at a comparatively faster speed than the one 
associated with Argentine companies’ weak innovation expenditure, the latter 
continuously diverge form said international border. 
From a mesoeconomic perspective (Table II.1), it is not possible to observe a clear 
difference regarding innovation investment between (medium) high-tech national 
manufacturing branches and (medium) low-tech domestic industrial sectors4. In fact, the 
Brazilian industry exhibited (although its GDP grew only 1,9% in the surveyed year and 
in spite of its productive specialization pattern being relatively similar to the Argentine 
one) a higher innovation expenditure in all its manufacturing branches, with the only 
exceptions of Rubber and plastic goods and Tobacco products.  
More so, the difference between both nations was superior in the high and medium-
high-tech industrial sectors, like Rest of transport equipment (in which Brazil counts 
with the plane assembler Embraer). Amid the former, only Argentine automotive5, 
pharmaceutical (included in chemical products) and medical equipment industries reach 



























                                                          
4The taxonomy used in this document differs slightly from the one defined by OCDE (1997), in order to 
suit it better to Argentine industry’s reality. 
5 In 2004, local automotive sector’s innovation expenditure was exceptionally weak due to the 
combination of a severe crunch in the domestic car market and a fall in vehicles’ and autoparts’ exports to 
Brazil.  




INNOVATION EXPENDITURE OF ARGENTINE AND BRAZILIAN 
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS BY MANUFACTURING SECTOR. 2004,ARG; 2003,BR. 
As a share of total sales: 
Manufacturing branch Argentina Brazil
Rest of transport equipment 1,4% 8,6%
Desk machinery and informatic equip. 2,0% 5,5%
Radio, tv and comunication equipment 3,0% 4,3%
Automotive industry 1,4% 3,9%
Machinery and equip. n.e.c. 1,7% 3,3%
Medical and optical equipment 2,9% 3,1%
Electronic machinery and equip. n.e.c. 1,5% 3,1%
Metal products, excl. mach. and eq. 2,3% 2,5%
Chemicals and chemical products 1,2% 2,2%
Pulp and paper products 2,1% 2,2%
Rubber and plastic products 2,3% 2,2%
Basic metals 0,9% 1,7%
Coke, petroleum refination and nuclear fuel 0,4% 1,4%
Textiles 1,1% 3,3%
Non-metallic mineral products 1,7% 2,7%
Manufacturing n.e.c. 1,3% 2,4%
Clothing industry 0,6% 2,3%
Wood and wood products, excl. ferniture 2,1% 2,3%
Leather and leather products 0,7% 2,1%
Food and beverage production 0,7% 1,8%
Publishing and printing 0,9% 1,7%






Source: Based on data from Indec (2006) and IBGE (2005). 
In summary, Argentine industrial firms’ comparatively low innovation expenditure is 
concentrated in high and medium-high-tech manufacturing sectors. This pattern 
conspires against the convergence of said segment towards international state of the art, 
since it is indeed those branches that suffer the greater gap and, even worse, involve 
product and process technologies that evolve continuously world-wide. On the contrary, 
(medium)low-tech domestic companies’ low innovative expenditure acquires a clearly 
inferior relevance, since the former (that include steel, raw aluminum, paper and food 
and beverage industries) have: i) reached the global knowledge frontier; ii) employ 
product and process technologies that are internationally stagnated (reason for which 
they are considered “technological mature activities”). 
As Argentine industry’s exact opposite, national agriculture was amongst the first to 
replicate the international state of the art “jump” that occurred in the middle nineties and 
that was associated with the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in 
said activity6. In fact, the amount of hectares sowed with transgenic plants in Argentina 
during 2007 (19,1 million) was only surpassed by the United States (57,7 millions), 
creator of this technology (Table II.2). In that way, domestic farmers exceeded the rest 
                                                          
6 GM soybean’s adoption in Argentina constitutes a world-wide example regarding a rapid large scale 
implementation of this new technology (Vicién, 2003). 
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of the main international agriculture producers in terms of their use of GMOs: Brazil 
(15 million), Canada (7) and the European Union.  
TABLE II.2. 
UTILIZATION OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED PLANTS BY VARIOUS 
NATIONS. 2007. 
In millions of seeded hectares with GMOs: 
Country Millions of hs. w/ GMO Crop
United States 57,7 Soybean, maize, cotton, canola, alfalfa, papaya and squash
Argentina 19,1 Soybean, maize and cotton
Brazil 15,0 Soybean and cotton
Canada 7,0 Canola, maize and soybean
India  6,2 Cotton
China  3,8 Cotton, tomato, poplar, petunia, papaya and sweet pepper
Paraguay  2,6 Soybean
South Africa  1,8 Maize, soybean and cotton
Uruguay 0,5 Soybean and maize  
Source: Based on data from ISAAA (2007). 
Nevertheless, at the mesoeconomic level, a significant difference is appraised between 
the use of GMOs and other global state of the art productive techniques (like direct 
sowing and modern agricultural machineries) in the domestic cultivation of cereals and 
oilseeds and the technological stagnation that is observed in some of the rest of 
traditional Argentine farming activities, like apple production and bovine cattle 
breeding7. 
On that matter, in 2001, approximately 80% of the surface sowed with sunflower, 
soybean, maize and wheat in Argentina exhibited high and medium technological 
standards (Table II.3). Other local farming activities that showed an elevated usage of 
state of the art knowledge were the breeding of chickens and the production of cow 
milk, pears and lemons. In contrast, only 50% of the domestic hectares destined to the 
cultivation of apples took advantage of high and medium technologies in 2001, 
percentage that reached 62% in the case of cattle raising. More so, different sources 
estimate that this duality within the agriculture sector has increased during the last years 
(for example, utilization of GMOs in the domestic sowing of soybean reached 99% in 
2007, while the productivity indicators of bovine cattle raising and apples production 
have remained stagnated/decreased8). 
TABLE II.3. 
DISPOSAL OF HIGH AND MEDIUM TECHNOLOGIAL STANDARDS 
AMONG THE MAIN ARGENTINE FARMING ACTIVITIES. 2001. 
As a share of respective labored surfaces: 
                                                          
7 Argentine indicators regarding cattle breeding and feeding are internationally low (Todesca, 2008): 
average weight is only 220 kilos (250 in Uruguay and Australia); extraction rate (animals killed in 
relation to total stock) is 25% whereas it surpasses 30% in Australia and United States; weaning rate is 
only 60%. In this sense, these standards could improve radically if producers adopted available 
technology as genetics, balanced food, machinery, vaccines and antibiotics. 
8 According to World Apple Report’s international competitiveness ranking, Argentina lost positions in 
the last lustrum, descending from the 12th place in 1997 to the 15th in 2005. 















Apple 50%  
Source: Based on data from INTA (2002). 
As a result, the presence of this innovation duality in the Argentine tradable sector 
determines a mesoeconomic transformation associated with the asymmetric evolution of 
production and export levels between different activities. On the one hand, innovative 
agricultural (e.g. soybean and lemon cultivation and chicken breeding) and 
manufacturing (e.g. automotive, pharmaceutical, petrochemical, paper and food and 
beverages industries) branches are able to increase their production and exports due to 
their closure to the international technological frontier. On the other hand, non 
innovative agricultural (e.g. beef and apple production) and manufacturing (high and 
medium-high-tech industries) activities are condemned to lose their share in national 
and, especially, global markets, as they constantly fall behind the expansion of the 
knowledge border. 




III. EXPLAINING ARGENTINE INNOVATIVE DUALITY: 
III.1. MACROECONOMIC POLICIES: 
The macroeconomic policies have an effect on price-competitiveness9 and, therefore, on 
tradable activities’ profit margins. In that way, macroeconomics is able to influence 
(positively or negatively) the innovative dynamics of said sector. 
• Macroeconomics and innovation during the nineties: 
During the nineties, in line with the Washington Consensus prescriptions, Argentina 
implemented an abrupt process of commercial opening (unilateral, at the decade’s 
beginning, and multilateral, in 1995, when the MERCOSUR – imperfect custom union 
between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay- was created). This macroeconomic 
reform had a dual effect on both tradable sector’s competitiveness and profit margins. 
On the one hand, the elimination of export duties and the reduction of import tariffs and 
other commercial barriers increased the yields of those companies located in the 
international technological frontier, as it raised their selling prices and lowered foreign 
inputs’ and machinery’s costs (which replaced local substitutes of greater price and/or 
inferior quality). On the other hand, the commercial opening process shrank the gain of 
those firms that were far from the global state of the art, as they had to either reduce 
their domestic prices in order to compete with foreign goods or suffer the retraction of 
their sales in the Argentine market. 
Another macroeconomic relevant factor was the real exchange rate’s appreciation, 
which determined a reduction in the whole tradable sector’s earning margins (as it 
lowered price-competitiveness). Naturally, said decrease was notoriously superior for 
labor intensive activities, whereas it represented a limited loss for natural resources and 
capital intensive sectors. 
Last, but not least, local markets were deregulated, in line with the Washington 
Consensus’ prescriptions. In particular, the Argentine State ceased defining farming 
products´ prices and monopolizing these goods’ exports, which implied a significant 
growth in agricultural sector’s profit margins. 
Undoubtedly, the former macroeconomic policies encouraged innovation in the tradable 
sector. In agriculture, as the majority of its activities was taking advantage of natural 
comparative advantages, said investments sought to catch up with the global 
technological state of the art with the objective of increasing production oriented to 
foreign markets10 (Figure III.1), thus benefiting from the greater profit margin generated 
by the commercial opening, the integration with other South American economies, the 
deregulation of local markets and, in the early nineties, the growth of international 
prices. More so, real exchange rate’s appreciation did not determine a significant 
adverse result on these activities’ yields, with the exception of labor intensive sectors 
like fruit (especially apple) and cotton production (which resulted in negative growth 
rates during that decade). 
                                                          
9 According to Bouzas and Fanelli (2001), competitiveness is defined by a non-price ingredient 
(productivity, scale and static comparative advantages) and a price component (that depends on factors’ 
dowry and on the exchange rate). 
10 Among the activities that showed a steady growth during the nineties, only chicken and milk 
production based their development in the local market. 




ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS OF MAIN 





















































Source: Based on data from Indec. 
Consequently, agriculture’s innovative dynamics was notably intense throughout this 
decade: oilseeds and cereals producers increased their use of agrochemicals, fertilizers 
and machineries (delayed implementation of the “green revolution”), adopted the direct 
sowing technique and, in the late nineties, put into operation GMOs (early embracing of 
biotechnology); chicken breeders invested in order to vertically integrate, to gain scale 
and to achieve a technological upgrade; fruit (especially lemons, pears and, to a lesser 
extent, grapes) producers incorporated sophisticated irrigation technologies, new 
varieties and augmented their utilization of agrochemicals and machinery; milk 
obtainers started employing balanced food to partially substitute grass, improved 
cattle’s genetics and increased their usage of vaccinations and machinery (especially 
freezing and milking equipment). 
In industry, the effect of macroeconomic reforms on innovation was more asymmetric 
(Figure III.2). The (medium)low technological intensive segment benefited from a raise 
in its profit margins, as it was close to the international competitiveness frontier before 
the commercial opening and consisted of natural resources and capital intensive 
activities (therefore, they were not radically perturbed by the real exchange rate’s 
appreciation11). This was the case of industrial activities like Steel, Aluminum, Food 
and Beverage, Leather, Petrochemistry (the only medium-high-tech branch associated 
with this “successful” group) and Paper. These sectors registered significant 
investments in the manufacture of tobacco, wines, cookies, treats, dairy goods, pasta, 
corrugated and tissue paper, plastics and rubber, pharmaceuticals, steel and aluminum12, 
                                                          
11 Among this industrial segment, the exceptions were clothing and footwear branches, as they suffered 
(and still suffer) both a price-competitiveness and a scale deficit regarding Brazilian and, fundamentally, 
Chinese and Asian competitors. 
12 Doubtlessly, multiple SMEs with old plants and reduced production scales belonged to this industrial 
segment in the early nineties. The former had difficulties to adapt to the new macroeconomic context and, 
Paper presented in the VI Globelics Conference at Mexico City, September 22-24 2008 
 
 13
associated to an export oriented expansion of productive capacity and to the upgrade of 
product and process technologies. 
FIGURE III.2. 



































(Medium) High Tech (excl. Aut.)
Automotive
 
Source: Based on data from Indec. 
On the contrary, (medium)high technological intensive activities predominated among 
industrial sectors that suffered the reduction of their profit margins in the nineties due to 
macroeconomic policies: Medical, optical and precision instruments, Rest of transport 
equipment, Machinery and equipment and Metal products. This group, that 
manufactures goods of fast technological obsolescence that require continuous 
innovation expenses, had to cope with a notorious productivity deficit that was 
deepened as a result of an abrupt jump in the international state of the art (associated 
with digitalization and with microprocessors’ and CAD/CAM systems’ incorporation). 
Only a handful of this segment’s firms applied the necessary innovations in order to 
reach the knowledge frontier and, hence, recover the yield they had before this macro 
reforms. As a result of their lack of convergence to the international competitiveness 
border, the majority of these local industries was displaced by imports and had to limit 
itself to take care of domestic market’s marginal segments. Even, some activities were 
discontinued during the last decade, as the manufacture of airplanes and diverse types of 
machinery and electronic equipment, while former producers turned into sellers of 
foreign goods. 
The main notable exception within (medium)high technological intensive sectors was 
the automotive industry, that managed to converge partially to the international state of 
the art due to commercial opening process’ "administration"13, although it reduced value 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consequently, closed or were absorbed by bigger companies (favoring the economic concentration’s 
increase). 
13 In this sector, the sudden commercial opening was administered through the sanction of the Decree for 
the Reconstruction of the Automotive Industry, in 1991, and the creation of the MERCOSUR, in 1995. 
The former allowed national producers to import parts and finished vehicles free of taxes if those were 
compensated by exports and if they had achieved investments associated with technology’s incorporation 
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added creation as a result of both an intense vertical disintegration policy and the raise 
of foreign inputs’ incidence. 
 
• Macroeconomic and innovation during the new century: 
Regarding its effect on both tradable sector’s gain margins and innovative dynamics, the 
main macroeconomic transformation of the new century was the real exchange rate’s 
depreciation (impelled by the Convertibility Regime’s fall, that implied the substitution 
of a fixed nominal exchange rate regime for a “dirty” floating regime). That reform 
created a price-competitiveness gain, that resulted in an increase in equally industry’s 
and agriculture’s yields, which was higher for labor intensive activities and lower for 
cereals, oilseeds and their manufactures (as export duties were reestablished for these 
goods14). Consequently, tradable sector’s firms implemented investments (e.g. 
expansion of productive capacity) and carried out innovative projects (e.g. technological 
upgrade). 
In agriculture, real exchange rate’s depreciation’s positive effect on firms’ price-
competitiveness and, consequently, on their profits was reinforced by the sustained 
increase in commodities’ international prices. Those higher earnings led to the 
development of innovation projects among this sector’s agents, with the main objective 
of expanding exports (Figure III.3) and, in a few cases (chicken and cotton), of 
supplying the raising domestic demand15. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and with new models’ launch. On the contrary, automobiles’ imports by non-producers were limited by 
quotas and had to pay taxes. In regards to MERCOSUR’s creation, a compensated commercial 
interchange of automobiles was established between this custom union’s members, so that Brazilian 
imports had to be compensated by Argentine exports to said country. In that way, the leading global 
producers decided to have plants both in Argentina and in Brazil, in order to distribute regional 
production and obtain scale economies. 
14 This reform had the purpose of leveling different tradable activities’ profit margins, reducing price-
competitiveness to the activities that were located on the international frontier (whose performance, 
therefore, did not depend crucially on the real exchange rate’s raise). 
15 Milk production’s stagnation between 2001 and 2007 was a result of a recessive sub-period that began 
in 2000 and lasted until 2003 (due to the simultaneous decrease in Brazilian and Argentine demands) and 
of an expansive phase that started in 2004, associated with the symmetric growth of exports and domestic 
consumption. 
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Source: Based on data from Indec. 
In this respect, the most innovative farming activities during the nineties (chicken, 
oilseeds, cereals, milk, pears and lemons) deepened their previously elevated usage of 
state of the art technologies. For example, the utilization of transgenic (insect resistant 
and herbicide tolerant) seeds in maize cultivation grew from 30% of total surface sowed 
with that cereal in 2002 to 73% in 2007. More so, the sectors that had to put up with real 
exchange rate’s appreciation during the nineties (e.g. cotton and grapes) implemented 
innovations in order to converge to the global knowledge frontier16. On the contrary, 
innovative investment in cattle raising and apple production continued stagnated, 
intensifying the technological duality within the agriculture sector. 
In (medium)low technologically intensive industrial branches (excluding clothing and 
footwear, which continued suffering the competence of Brazilian and, especially, Asian 
production), simultaneous augmentation in real exchange rate and in international prices 
led to an expansion of these firms’ profit margins. It is important to mention that the 
former had a significantly weaker effect on industries’ revenues, since these activities 
(e.g. Basic metals, Food and Beverage, Leather, Petrochemistry and Paper) do not use 
labor intensively. Anyway, both impulses caused an export-led growth for these 
manufacturing sectors, which demanded investments’ concretion (Figure III.4). 
Fundamentally, said projects were related to installed capacity’s addition, as a 
technological upgrade was not necessary due to these branches’ position above the state 
of the art international frontier. 
                                                          
16 The percentage of surface sowed with cotton that utilized transgenic seeds (insect resistant and 
herbicide tolerant), that was almost null in 2002, rose to 80% in 2007, whereas grape producers 
accelerated their employment of new varieties in order to provide the rising wine export’s demand. 















1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
(Medium) Low Tech
(Medium) High Tech (excl. Aut.)
Automotive
 
Source: Based on data from Indec. 
Similarly, (medium)high technological intensive industrial activities did not increase 
substantially their innovative investment in the new century. In this case, the price-
competitiveness growth associated with the new macroeconomic regime was 
insufficient to compensate the non-price-competitiveness deficit (due to their notorious 
distance from the global knowledge frontier). Consequently, these firms were only able 
to augment their share in the domestic market, although they could not expand their 
exports. 
Nonetheless, a few (medium)high-tech activities (like Medical instruments, Sowing 
machinery and Pharmaceuticals) have taken advantage of the macro engendered price-
competitiveness upsurge to enhance the innovative dynamics they had meekly started 
during the nineties and, as a result, have lengthened their presence both in local and in 
foreign markets. In fact, these branches spent between 2% and 3% of their sales in 
innovative projects between 2002 and 2004, period in which Argentina was passing 
through a noteworthy economic and social crisis. More so, the production of Medical 
Instruments shows the highest figure of R+D investment within Argentine manufacture 
(1,14% of sales in 2004). As a result, new competitive actors have consolidated within 
national industry’s medium-high technological intensive segment. 
Finally, Argentine automotive industry’s (high-tech branch) recent evolution was 
significantly more influenced by local institutions than by real exchange rate’s 
depreciation. During the late nineties, this activity had continuously declined due to a 
steady domestic market’s reduction and Brazilian purchases’ decrease. Besides, as 
MERCOSUR had established a free automobiles commercial interchange between 
members from the year 2000 onwards and as Brazil granted a bigger market, loans, 
taxes reductions and several incentives to new automotive investments, international 
manufacturers assigned their new regional models to their Brazilian plants. In order to 
prevent domestic automotive industry’s stagnation, local Government decided to 
indefinitely delay free commercial interchange. That policy, plus domestic automobiles’ 
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demand’s recovery and local currency’s depreciation, encouraged new models’ 
systematic launch by Argentine industry since 200417 (Bernat, 2008). 
 
• Macroeconomics as a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for 
innovation: 
The existence of a macroeconomic environment that affects positively tradable sector’s 
firms’ profit margins has been a usual prerequisite for an innovative dynamics in 
Argentina but not a sufficient condition. In effect, the hasty convergence of main local 
agriculture activities to the international state of the art frontier occurred when the 
macroeconomic context was favorable: commercial opening and domestic markets’ 
deregulation impelled innovation in the production of chicken, sunflower, soybean, 
maize, wheat, milk, pears and lemons in the nineties, whereas the real exchange rate’s 
depreciation (and international prices’ sustained expansion) promoted said investment 
in most of the previous sectors plus the cultivation of grapes and cotton (labor intensive 
sectors) during the last lustrum. 
However, a favorable macroeconomic context was not enough to guarantee a radical 
innovation raise in beef and apple production neither in the nineties nor during the new 
century and, consequently, both technological levels have remained significantly below 
international standards. Also, real exchange rate’s increase was insufficient to promote 
an innovative dynamics in (medium)high-tech manufacturing sectors in the last lustrum. 
This weak link between macroeconomics and innovation in Argentina can be attributed 
to the prevalence of “defensive strategies” amongst tradable firms, especially 
manufacturing SMEs (Bernat, 2008). In particular, domestic industry’s recent behavior 
on said subject demonstrates that innovation "reacts" with a lag to changes in the 
macroeconomic context (Figure III.4). After the sudden commercial opening process 
and market deregulation, local manufacturing companies only gradually increased their 
innovative investment, that grew from 3% of their sales in 1992 to 3,7% in 1996. 
Similarly, in 2002, real exchange rate’s depreciation generated a continuous expansion 
in innovative expenditure, from 0,92% to 1,12% in 2004. Anyway, these last figures 
were inferior to the nineties’ percentages, that were broadened by (medium)high-tech 
industrial firms’ necessity to converge rapidly to the knowledge frontier. 
                                                          
17 In fact, Argentina’s automotive industry will have its first green-field investment in nearly a decade by 
2009, when Honda’s car production plant (in Campana, Buenos Aires Province) is ready to begin 
assemblage. 




ARGENTINE INDUSTRY’S INNOVATION INVESTMENT. 
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Source: Based  on data from Indec’s various Innovation Surveys. 
Literature on investment irreversibility (Pindyck, 1988; Caballero, 1991; Pindyck and 
Solimano, 1993; among others) determines that, in highly volatile economies like 
Argentina, prevailing uncertainty forbids the accomplishment of investment projects. 
The former is based on the hypothesis that, if investments can be delayed, companies 
are enticed to adopt “waiting and seeing” strategies, avoiding immediate expenditures in 
endeavors of uncertain returns (Kosacoff and Ramos, 2006). Therefore, possibility of 
waiting becomes a central component in the process of evaluating when to invest. In 
fact, the option value of delaying projects is comparatively greater in volatile economies 
and, accordingly, so is the threshold yield companies demand to carry out investments 
(Caballero and Pindyck, 1996). These defensive strategies affect innovative projects 
with a considerably greater intensity, since the latter include costs, maturation periods 
and risks clearly superior to the rest of investments. 
In Argentina, innovation’s retarded reaction is strongly related to the rise in risk 
perception that changes in macroeconomic regimes engender (Bernat, 2006). In those 
situations, local agents prefer to delay their investment decisions in order to make a 
more profound analysis of new macroeconomic “rules of the game”. On the one hand, 
risk perception was higher in 1992 (when macro reforms like commercial opening and 
market’s deregulation were being implemented) than in 1996 (when said 
transformations were consolidated18). On the other hand, risk perception was 
notoriously elevated in 2002/2004, when the post Convertibility macroeconomics’ 
sustainability was severely uncertain. In this regard, 2004’s reduced innovation level, 
plus high volatility’s domestic history, demonstrate that (ceteris paribus microeconomic 
policies) a prolonged persistence of current macroeconomic conditions will be 
necessary in order to eradicate “defensive strategies” within local firms. 
Last, when a combination of certain microeconomic factors prevail, macroeconomics 
might not be even a necessary condition for innovation. In Argentina, soybean 
                                                          
18 In this sense, the recovery from the 1995’s Tequila Crisis represented a signal of Convertibility 
regime’s strength and, thus, a downfall in risk perception. 
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producer’s last innovative wave (associated with the adoption of herbicide tolerant 
GMOs) started in 1996/1997, when interest rates increased, credit restrictions tightened 
and international prices started falling. In that deteriorated macro and global context, 
farmers had to face accumulated commercial and financial debts (engendered by the 
need to catch up with the “green revolution” in the early nineties) with diminished 
yields. In that moment, soybean cultivators implemented a “forward exit” (Bisang, 
2001) as they assimilated GMOs in order to reduce their costs19 and to enable double-
sowing in the same year (usually, wheat in winter and soybean in summer), restoring 
their profit margins and enabling their repayment of contracted debts. 
As the innovation in local soybean production was a result of a very particular 
microeconomic configuration, a macroeconomic context that affects favorably 
Argentine tradable firm’s profit margins constitutes a necessary condition for a strong 
innovative dynamics in the rest of said sector. Nevertheless, the study of both the 
soybean case and other successful innovative activities can provide evidence regarding 
microeconomics factors required to complement macroeconomics in order to boost 
innovation within domestic agriculture and industry. Consequently, the following 
section will be dedicated to the study of innovation barriers of microeconomic order in 
the Argentine tradable sector. 
 
III.2. MICROECONOMIC BARRIERS: 
The following Table (III.1) reveals that Argentine industry’s innovative dynamics has 
dealt with six fundamental restrictions during the nineties20: long return period, 
innovation’s risks, difficulties regarding credit access, market’s size and structure and 
high innovation costs. 
                                                          
19 On that matter, in 1997, the cost of sowing with the conventional package was approximately us$115 
by hectare, whereas by combining genetically modified seeds and herbicide it diminished to us$90 
(Bisang, 2001), due to the reduction in labor’s (fundamentally, in the control of weeds) and biocides’ 
usage and the comparatively inferior increase in seeds’ (as GMOs are more expensive than traditional 
products) and fertilizers’ expenses. 
20 No data is available regarding barriers encountered by industrial companies in the new century. 
Nevertheless, the persistence of these obstacles during the nineties sustains the perception that they 
should have been relevant after 2001. 




ARGENTINE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS’ INNOVATION BARRIERS. 1992-1996 / 
1998-2001.  
As a share of total answers*: 
Barrier 1992-1996 1998-2001
Long return period 32 51
Shortage of qualified labor 6 37
Innovation risks 43 32
Organizational rigidity 7 28
Difficulties regarding credit access 63 68
Market’s size 32 58
Market’s structure 12 55
Limited sectorial technological dynamics 6 40
Limited cooperation with firms and institutions 4 40
Easy imitation by rivaling firms 5 32
High innovation costs 43 51
Weak public policies regarding Science and Technology 10 42
Weak development regarding Science and Technology institutions 2 38
Physical infrastructure 21 29
Insufficient information regarding markets 6 27
Insufficient information regarding technologies 6 22





* This percentage is a result of dividing answers that considered that each barrier had 
“high” or “medium” relevance by total answers. 
Source: Based  on data from Indec’s various Innovation Surveys. 
Notably, five of these six main innovation’s barriers (credit access, market’s size and 
structure and innovative costs and risks) were stronger for Small and Medium national 
manufacturing firms than for bigger companies (Table III.2). 
TABLE III.2. 
ARGENTINE INDUSTRIES’ INNOVATION BARRIERS BY FIRM SIZE. 1998-
2001.  
As a share of total answers: 
Barrier Small Firms Medium Firms Big Firms
Difficulties regarding credit access 73,7 58,7 45,4
Market’s size 59,1 57,1 52,1
Market’s structure 55,6 54,5 49,5
High innovation costs 54,9 43,5 36,8
Long return period 49,3 55,8 60,4
Innovation risks 35,6 25,1 17,6  
Source: Based  on data from Indec (2003). 
Of the six hurdles mentioned above, published studies frequently take into account 
firm’s size and market’s structure. In the first case, surveyed papers (eg. Yoguel and 
Rabertino, 2000; Arza, 2003; Sanguinetti, 2005; Chudnovsky et al, 2006; Goncalves et 
al, 2008; among others) found out that size affects positively firm’s innovative 
expenditure. In the second case, evidence is contradictory, as some studies (e.g. 
Goncalves et al, 2008) discovered that market’s concentration has a favorable incidence 
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in innovative dynamics while others (eg. Sanguinetti, 2005; Sánchez et al, 2006) 
supported the contrary. 
Anyway, only one of these six barriers (credit access) was significant for agriculture 
firms’ innovative dynamics (Table III.3). Besides, productive scale was another 
notorious obstacle for farming sector’s innovation, in line with the differences observed 
regarding obstacles between SMEs and big industrial companies. As a result, while the 
former utilized conventional (and frequently obsolete) technologies, bigger farmers 
usually employed state of the art techniques (INTA, 2002). 
TABLE III.3. 
ARGENTINE AGRICULTURE FIRMS’ INNOVATION BARRIERS. 2001.  
As a share of total answers: 
Barrier Share
Difficulties regarding access to credit 15,1
Lack of skills to implement technological upgrade 12,9
Limited profitability of technological alternatives 11,8
Productive scale 10,6
Insufficient coordination with buyers 8,7
Difficulties to commercialize bigger quantities 8,1
Production's social organization 6,9
Shortage of qualified labor 6,8
Lack of training services regarding new technologies 6,5
Lack of private services to carry on innovation 4,6
Limited cooperation with firms and institutions 4,1
Insufficient offer of inputs and technologies 2,8
Inadequate land occupation 1,1  
Source: Based on data from INTA (2002). 
Consequently, the rest of this section will be dedicated to study these hurdles. In 
particular, as the majority of industrial barriers do not affect agriculture agents’ 
innovation, a comparison will be established regarding each topic between both sectors, 
in order to identify the factors which have enabled farming firms to surpass the 
obstacles manufacturing companies still deal with. 
 
• CREDIT ACCESS: 
Difficulties regarding credit access represented the main restriction for both domestic 
industry’s (Table III.1) and local agriculture’s (Table III.3) innovation process during 
the nineties, hurdle that was significantly stronger for small and medium manufacturing 
companies (Table III.2). Even more, although this obstacle’s weight is commonly 
countercyclical, its relevance in Argentina was constant throughout said decade. 
Remarkably, this barrier shows a smaller relevance in the rest of studied countries: in 
Italy, Netherlands and Belgium, it was the second factor in importance, whereas for 
Brazil and Spain, the third, and for Germany, the fourth. This evidence suggests credit 
rationing is especially deep in our country. 
Innovation investment has two financing sources. First, companies can use internally 
originated funds, like retained earnings and transfers from related firms. Secondly, they 
are able to access external financing sources provided by the banking system, the capital 
market, suppliers, clients and various public and private institutions and organizations. 
On that matter, during 2004, 82% of small and medium industries’ innovation 
investment was funded with internal resources, especially through the reinvestment of 
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profits. Meanwhile, the banking system (main external funding source21) only financed 
9% of innovation expenditure carried out by Argentine manufacturing SMEs22. It is 
important to acknowledge that this internally based financial structure was similar 
during the nineties (Figure III.6). 
FIGURE III.6. 
SMALL AND MEDIUM INDUSTRIES’ INNOVATION EXPENDITURE 
FINANCING STRUCTURE. 1998-2004. 











Internal funds Banks Firms Institutional Others
1998-2001 2004  
Source: Based on data from Indec (2003 y 2006). 
Hurdles regarding external financing sources in Argentine agriculture and industry are a 
result of both supply’s and demand’s shortfalls. On the one side, the domestic banking 
system went through a significant restructuring process during the nineties, that was 
associated with the massive closing or acquisition of provincial, municipal and 
cooperative institutions (which were specialized in servicing the tradable sector), 
whereas “surviving” entities preferred to attend consumption’s and public sector’s 
funding needs (Albrieu and Fanelli, 2007). On the other side, credit demand is restricted 
by three causes: 1) self-financing preference (firms that do not need external resources 
or avoid them as a consequence of macroeconomic volatility23); 2) potential demand 
(companies that are not satisfied with current funding conditions as interest rates, 
repayment periods and collateral requests, but that would ask for finance if said terms 
changed); 3) red-liners (highly indebted firms that do not apply for credit as they would 
be inevitably denied by financial suppliers). 
                                                          
21 As the local financial system is bank-based, innovative projects funded through capital markets are 
notoriously scarce. Therefore, this second external financing source will not be adressed in the rest of this 
section. 
22 There is no available data regarding small and medium farming agents, although it is possible to state 
that their access to bank’s credit is similar to industry’s. Nevertheless, as it shall be analyzed later, 
agriculture producers have a fluid funding from their providers and clients. 
23 Due to the repeated occurrence of phases of intense reduction in activity levels, numerous SMEs that 
were indebted confronted difficulties to fulfill their financial commitments and, in diverse occasions, fell 
into bankruptcy by the weight of those liabilities. As a result, this group of firms chooses to self-finance 
investments, avoiding financial debts that could become unsustainable before a steep and intense 
macroeconomic recession. 
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The main adverse effect of this self-financing configuration is that innovation 
investments concretion does not depend on its importance (e.g. to adapt to the 
commercial opening regime or to take advantage of real exchange rate’s depreciation), 
but on the availability of internal funds to carry out said expenditures. Thus, the 
execution of strategic innovative projects must be delayed until firms collect sufficient 
resources as to deal with said costs, turning investment dependent on companies’ 
liquidity (Schiantarelli, 1996). Besides, as the gathering of internal funds requires an 
expanded lapse (since innovations are habitually onerous), this self-financing behavior 
magnifies the “defensive strategies” mentioned previously. 
Nevertheless, financing restrictions have not affected the entirety of Argentine tradable 
sector. First, due to their significant presence in foreign markets and their association 
with global companies, Argentine Food and Beverage, Steel, Aluminum, Petrochemical, 
Paper and Automotive firms have had (and still have) a smooth access to internal (intra-
company transfers) and external (national and international banks, capital markets and 
suppliers and multilateral institutions) financing sources. 
Secondly, oilseeds and cereals producers, one of the more innovative local tradable 
activities, have relied on supplier’s resources to fund their investments. In particular, 
said sector’s financing, that had been scarcely and costly provided by banks in the early 
nineties, was outstandingly increased by the end of said decade when “Service Centers” 
developed. Notably, this new figure in Argentine farming was closely associated with 
the rapid and massive adoption of state of the art technologies like GMOs and direct 
sowing. 
Service Centers are selling places which concentrate not only the supply of GM seeds, 
fertilizers and agrochemicals but, also, provide ground analysis and technical advising 
services and, especially, financing. This companies are usually directly controlled by 
agriculture input producers, especially, the main international suppliers’ subsidiaries. 
These Centers developed during the last decade, when seeds, agrochemicals and 
fertilizers manufacturers started creating exclusive or semi-exclusive distribution 
channels through the absorption of existing small and medium commercial firms. As the 
local market evolved towards a greater volume of inputs utilization, Service Centers 
incorporated the financing service. 
Nowadays, these firms have a centralized credit evaluation procedure for the greater 
clients (approximately 60% of total buyers), that is carried out by a risk analysis team. 
On the contrary, small producers’ funding risk is evaluated decentralizedly through the 
commercial channel. During the last years, Service Centers have funded nearly 80% of 
local input consumption, particularly through “exchange plans” that allow producers to 
pay with cereals and oilseeds after harvest (Alvarez, 2003). 
Finally, tractors and sowing and harvesting machines manufacturers tend to provide 
finance to their buyers. Especially, oilseeds and cereals cultivators are able to repay 
these debts after harvest (either with grains or with the money resulting from the 
commercialization of said goods), as their investment projects have a maturation period 
inferior to a year (in contrast with apple and beef producers’ or industrial innovations24). 
 
• HIGH INNOVATION COSTS: 
                                                          
24 Fruit cultivation and cattle breeding have investment patterns similar to the industrial one, as they 
require strong initial disbursements that have a slow maturation. 
Paper presented in the VI Globelics Conference at Mexico City, September 22-24 2008 
 
 24
Elevated costs constituted the second most notorious barrier for domestic manufacturing 
firms’ innovative dynamics during the nineties, restriction that was appreciably deeper 
for small and medium industries. On the contrary, this hurdle did not significantly 
weaken agriculture’s innovation. 
Innovation costs, usually elevated, are especially high in Argentina due to local tradable 
firms’ preference for apprehending technology incorporated in machinery and 
equipment, pattern which is frequently more onerous than endogenous knowledge 
creation or its assimilation through non incorporated exogenous sources. More so, the 
presence of comparatively superior costs in Argentina strengthens other innovation 
barriers. On the one side, credit restrictions (mentioned previously) become steeper 
when innovations costs are high, as firms have to delay their investments for a 
prolonged lapse until they are able to cumulate the internal funds necessary to self-
finance their projects. On the other side, innovation’s risks (which will be mentioned 
later) increase pari passu with cost’s magnitude, due to the fact that companies have to 
sink large amounts in order to carry out their projects. 
Since the second half of the nineties, the upsurge of “contractors” within Argentine 
agriculture has radically contributed to diminish said sector’s innovation costs. 
Contractors provide machinery and equipment services (e.g. sowing, harvesting and 
fumigation) for farmers, especially for oilseeds and cereals producers. In this way, the 
latter are able to avoid elevated innovation costs associated with machinery and 
equipment investments25. 
Contractors are specialized in the ownership and administration of a productive factor 
(capital), diversifying risks (by working in different geographical areas) and exploiting 
tacit knowledge, financial capabilities (having credit access with both banks and 
machinery’s manufacturers) and strong relationships with other agriculture agents like 
Service Centers (Lódola, 2008). Nowadays, contractors harvest more than 60% of total 
sowed surface. 
Although contractors appeared in Argentine agriculture in the early 20th century, their 
relevance spread out during the last lustrum of the nineties, when direct sowing 
technique (which demanded more powerful, and thus more expensive, machines) and 
GMOs (that required agrochemical’s and fertilizers’ application’s services and allowed 
productive frontier’s expansion) became massive26. Besides, contractors contributed to 
alleviate financing restrictions, as they usually provide funding to their clients 
(including inputs like seeds, agrochemicals and fertilizers). Finally, contractors’ 
expansion facilitated the last technological change’s rapid homogenization within 
cereals and oilseeds producers (Barsky and Gelman, 2001).   
 
• INNOVATION’S RISKS AND RETURN PERIOD: 
                                                          
25 According to Pucciarelli (1997), agriculture’s social and technical organization started mutating since 
the sixties, as farmers began assigning the majority of labors to contractors, avoiding capital goods’ 
purchases and workers’ direct hiring and retaining global production and commercialization process’ 
control and coordination. 
26 Contractors are clearly less relevant for Australian and American producers. In this respect, their 
importance in Argentina arose as a result of a causal combination: their historical development, capital 
market imperfections and farmers´ defensive strategies oriented to avoid onerous investments (Lódola, 
2008). 
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Innovation’s risks and return period represented the third most relevant restriction for 
Argentine industry’s innovative dynamics during the nineties, hurdle that was 
significantly stronger for small and medium manufacturing companies. Notably, this 
barrier did not affect agriculture’s innovation. 
Innovation’s risk has both a macroeconomic (cyclical and symmetrical) and a 
microeconomic (structural and asymmetrical) component. As was stated previously, 
local macroeconomic volatility raises innovation risks, especially when macro regimes 
changes occur. In said contexts, local agents choose to postpone their innovative 
projects until they can make a profounder lecture of the new “rules of the game”. This 
risk is countercyclical, as when macroeconomic fundamentals stabilize (as took place 
pre and post tequila’s crisis and post Convertibility regime’s fall), it dwindles. More so, 
this risk component has a symmetrical effect, affecting the whole tradable sector’s 
innovative investments. 
On the contrary, microeconomic innovation’s risk is structural and asymmetrical, since 
it is related to the type of projects firms carry out. On the one side, (medium)high-tech 
industries execute inherently more hazardous innovative projects. These companies, 
predominantly SMEs, have to endogenously develop new technologies, frequently 
associated with product innovations, for the reason that they can not significantly 
appraise them through exogenous knowledge sources (machinery and equipment, 
software, hardware, transfers and consultancies). Thus, this segment’s innovation entails 
internal R+D expenditures, design activities and reverse and adaptative engineering, 
which have a higher risk and, usually, a longer maturation period. 
On the other side, (medium)low-tech industries (e.g. Food and Beverage, Basic Metals, 
Petrochemistry, Paper) and the majority of farming branches (with the exception of 
cattle breeding, which can be included in the preceding group) are able to innovate 
almost exclusively via the adoption of exogenously generated technology (habitually 
imported), either incorporated in machinery, equipment, software and productive inputs 
or unincorporated27 (external R+D, consultancies and transfers). This segment’s projects 
are usually connected with processes, transport and logistics innovations and production 
reorganizations. Obviously, the former investments have a considerably smaller risk and 
a shorter maturation period. 
More so, soybean and maize producers count with the additional advantage that GMO’s 
usage has been actively promoted by Service Centers. In fact, these suppliers offer 
complete technological packages per cereal/oilseed articulated from GM seeds, which 
contain codified instructions regarding the adoption of specified products 
(agrochemicals and fertilizers) and agronomical practices. Usually, these packages 
include counseling services on the subject of associated cultivation techniques, thus 
reducing ostensibly this innovation’s risk. Consequently, these packages diminish 
farmers’ discretionality when selecting their production function, partly transferring that 
decision towards Service Centers (Alvarez, 2003). More so, these commercialization 
agents conform a national technologies’ and knowledge’s diffusion network (Bisang, 
2001). 
                                                          
27This unbalanced innovative investment’s structure determines an inferior positive effect on these firms’ 
competitiveness, since weak efforts are made regarding the generation of incremental knowledge, in order 
to adapt the external technology to the idiosyncratic features of local human and entrepreneurial 
resources. 
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Finally, non-profit organizations (e.g. AACREA –technology supporter- and 
AAPRESID –direct sowing promoter-) and private institutions integrated by farming 
businessmen (e.g. ACSOJA -soybean producers-, MAIZAR -maize-, ASAGIR-
sunflower- and AAPROTRIGO –wheat-) have had (and still do) an active role regarding 
innovation’s encouragement and development in both oilseeds and cereals production, 
thus diminishing these investments’ risks. 
• MARKET’S SIZE AND STRUCTURE: 
Market’s size and structure constituted the fourth most relevant barrier for local 
industry’s innovative dynamics during the nineties, hurdle that was ostensibly tougher 
for small and medium manufacturing firms. Again, this restriction did not disturb 
significantly agriculture’s innovation. 
This barrier’s effect on innovation is linked to said investment’s profitability. On the 
one side, innovative projects have a potentially higher gain when firms participate in a 
bigger market (as the former are more easily amortized) and enjoy a certain amount of 
market power (as they could translate to prices eventual additional costs). On the other 
side, innovations are usually less profitable when companies partake in smaller market 
(as it is more difficult to amortize investments) and lack market power (as they are 
unable to translate additional costs to prices). 
(Medium)high-tech manufacturing firms, excluding Automotive and Petrochemical 
industries, habitually attend a small fraction of the narrow domestic market (as they 
have small export levels) and lack market power (due to an intense competition with 
imported goods that take advantage of lower prices or better technological standards). 
More so, their profitability is frequently threatened as a result of their 
monopolical/oligopolical suppliers’ (especially basic inputs’ manufacturers) 
dependence. 
On the contrary, (medium)low-tech industries, excluding textiles, clothing and footwear 
manufacturing, and farming activities, excluding chicken, milk and grape production, 
participate in big markets, as they not only provide local demand but, also, have a 
significant presence in foreign markets28. Besides, although these agents are price-takers 
as exporters, they exploit their market power locally (especially, Food and Beverage, 
Steel and Paper industries) which is founded in their productive structure as 
monopolies/oligopolies. 
Finally, non-exporting firms have to deal with a domestic market that is not only small 
but, also, highly volatile. Hence, said volatility encourages defensive strategies amongst 
(medium)high-tech industries, as domestic demand often shrinks while investments 
mature, making innovative expenditures’ amortization strongly improbable. In fact, 
many manufacturing companies that had awaited until 1997/1998 for the domestic 
market to be big enough to turn innovations profitable, were unable to amortize their 
investments when local economy entered a recessive phase and, thus, fell into 
bankruptcy. 
 
• FIRM SIZE: 
                                                          
28 In this respect, some published studies (Yoguel and Rabertino, 2000; Chudnovsky et al, 2006) found a 
positive relationship between exports and innovation. 
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The previously analyzed innovation barriers do not affect big firms and SMEs equally 
(Table III.2). In particular, larger companies are usually able to overcome these hurdles. 
In this respect, the former have access to various funding sources, both internal (related 
firm’s transfers) and external (national/foreign banking and capital markets, suppliers, 
multinational organisms, Governments); face comparatively smaller innovation costs 
(as they take advantage of large cash flows) and risks (as they have both better 
information to “read” macroeconomic tendencies and solider patrimonies with which to 
affront eventual projects failures); participate in bigger markets (as a result of a 
considerable presence in external markets); and, at least locally, exploit their market 
power (due to their configuration as monopolies or oligopolies)29. 
Within Argentine industry, big firms predominate in Food an Beverage, Steel, 
Aluminum, Paper, Automobiles and Petrochemicals manufacturing. The former have 
innovated during the last decades in order to retain their positions above the 
international state of the art frontier and, in the automotive industry’s case, to rapidly 
converge to said technological border. On the contrary, SMEs prevail in (medium)low-
tech manufacturing activities, like Machinery, Medical equipment and Rest of transport 
equipment production. These sectors have permanently dealt with mentioned 
restrictions and, with a few exceptions, have not been able to reach global state of the 
art. 
As Table III.3 showed, agriculture’s innovation is also affected by firm’s size, as a 
limited productive scale was the main innovative dynamics’ barrier for 10,6% of total 
farming companies. Nevertheless, the upsurge of new productive agents, on the one 
side, and the articulation between small farmers and bigger Food and Beverage 
industries, on the other side, have contributed to surpass said hurdle. 
During the early nineties, “Sowing Pools” and “Direct Investment Funds” (DIF) arose 
with the objective of increasing productive scale without concentrating land ownership 
(which is significantly atomized in Argentina). Sowing Pools are associations in which 
proprietors rent their lands to farming labors’ administration companies that carry out 
production with both their own funds and capitals from clients or investors (often 
external to the primary sector). In spite of a great heterogeneity in terms of sizes and 
legal forms, the conformation of a Sowing Pool requires the involvement of three 
agents: 1) land owners, 2) a technical consultant or agronomist, and 3) investors 
(Ghezán et al, 2001). Direct Investment Funds differ from Sowing Pools mainly due to 
their strong legal base, that requires the participation of more actors: 1) investors; 2) 
capital market’s agents (responsible for selling the participations in the DIF); 3) 
organizer or technical operator (in charge of production); 4) societal manager or 
administrator; 5) auditor and 6) land owners (IICA, 1997). 
Regarding innovation, both productive organizations are able to take advantage of scale 
economies and to diminish climatic and economic risks. In the first case, they exploit 
their productive scales to cheapen their technology access from input’s and capital 
goods’ providers, increasing innovative investments’ profit margins (third most relevant 
restriction according to Table III.3). In the second case, both diversify geographical 
areas and crops, growing mainly soybean, sunflower, wheat and maize in Argentina’s 
most productive region (“nucleus”), but also cultivating sorghum, cotton, peanut and 
                                                          
29 This statement is in line with Schumpeter’s latest hypothesis (1942), that established that bigger 
oligopolical firms have an advantage to carry out formal R+D activities, in opposition to said author’s 
first hypothesis (1934), which affirmed that small entrepreneurs are the key actors in the innovative 
process. 
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forages in marginal zones (like the North East). Besides, due to the presence of highly 
qualified technical consultants, these agglomerations cumulate the necessary skills to 
implement technological upgrade (second most important hurdle for farmers). 
Consequently, these associations have been able to surpass several innovation barriers, 
converging to the global state of the art. Unfortunately, domestic macroeconomic 
volatility has limited the development of both agents in farming productions that have 
longer maturation periods, like fruits growing and cattle breeding (Nava, 2003). 
Alternatively, strong articulations between, on the one side, atomized small farmers and, 
on the other side, bigger Food and Beverage industries or traders30, contributed notably 
to boost innovation in the primary production of lemons, pears, grapes31 and milk32 
during the last decades. In all of the above cases, through contractual or informal 
relations, manufacturing companies transferred technologies or funding to their 
suppliers, granting them a certain demand (quantity and/or price) if  the latter achieved 
specified innovative targets. In that way, coordination within each chain contributed to 
surpass lack of funding and skills to carry out innovations, the first and second most 
notorious barriers for agriculture. 
On the contrary, stagnated technological levels in apple and beef production originated 
in a feeble coordination inside both complexes. In the first case, farmers and 
packagers/juice producers are constantly in conflict regarding apple’s qualities, 
commercialization terms and prices. In the second case, disputes are generalized (as 
they are usual between breeders and cattle feeders, feeders and beef manufacturers and 
exporting industries and non exporting factories), generating disincentives that 
determine an inefficient productive and yield distribution, lack of coordination 
throughout the chain and weak non-price-competitiveness (Bisang, 2003). 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
In Argentina, tradable sector’s innovation faces both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic restrictions. In the first case, inadequate macro policies (e.g. real 
exchange rate’s appreciation during the nineties) and idiosyncratic volatility diminish 
profit margins and promote the adoption of defensive strategies, respectively, restricting 
or delaying innovative projects’ implementation. Regarding microeconomic hurdles, 
tradable sector’s firms deal with several barriers that, especially in funding deficit’s 
case, are particularly intense in our country. 
This paper showed that numerous tradable activities have been able to surpass these 
macro and micro obstacles. First, (medium)low-tech industrial branches like Food and 
Beverage, Steel, Aluminum and Paper manufacturing, plus Automotive and 
Petrochemical industries, relied on their bigger firm size to overcome both type of 
barriers. As stated previously, these larger companies were benefited by macroeconomic 
                                                          
30 Lemon’s and pear’s chain’s development was based on the uprising of elevated scaled productions 
associated to large traders (Rodríguez de Tappatá, 2003). 
31 In fact, duality manifests within grape cultivation as quality wine industries have promoted their 
supplier’s convergence to the international state of the art, while the rest of farmers (whose production is 
oriented to the manufacture of low quality wine that is exclusively consumed locally) continue utilizing 
obsolete technologies (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2003). 
32 Duality also manifests between Argentine milk producers. There exist a small number of mega inns 
with significant capital investments, highly efficient medium inns and numerous small inns which usually 
produce outside sanitary, social and fiscal norms (Bisang et al, 2003). 
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policies that enhanced their yields, whereas they possessed a greater capacity (e.g. 
analytical, to “read” macro regime’s dynamics) to withstand volatility. Besides, they 
have access to various funding sources, face comparatively smaller innovative costs and 
risks, participate in bigger markets and, at least locally, exploit their market power. 
Anyway, the former manufacturing segment has not needed to carry out an intense 
innovative dynamics recently, as its firms were already above the international state of 
the art and are technologically mature branches. More so, this group’s innovation is not 
taken into account by usual international comparisons, which are R+D focused, due to 
these companies’ preference for exogenously generated knowledge (mainly 
incorporated in foreign machinery and equipment). 
Secondly, agriculture activities like oilseeds, cereals, chicken, milk, pear and lemon 
productions have also been able to surpass mentioned micro restrictions, in spite of their 
comparatively smaller productive scale. In this regard, as it was analyzed in this paper, 
the former activities’ innovative dynamics have counted with the collaboration of their 
providers (machinery, inputs, contractors), clients (Food and Beverage industries), 
investors (sowing pools and Direct Investment Funds) and different private 
organizations33. 
In this respect, the former agricultural activities are organized in network systems, that 
imply coordination between such diverse actors as farmers, suppliers, clients, investors, 
workers, technicians and science and technology institutions. These networks allow the 
improvement of each link’s profits through formal or informal contracts, which specify 
not only transactions’ financial conditions and prices but, also, include tangible and 
intangible information’s, productive experiences’ and knowledge’s flows (Bisang and 
Kosacoff, 2006). 
On the contrary, (medium)high-tech industrial branches and apple and beef productions 
have had neither the size nor the articulation with other agents necessary to surpass 
macro and micro innovative barriers. In the first case, only a few notable exceptions 
(like medical equipment, sowing machines and pharmaceuticals) have showed a strong 
innovative dynamics in the last decades, due to their possession of elevated initial skills 
and their original proximity to the international technological frontier. This segment’s 
weak innovation expenditure, that possesses a more R+D oriented configuration, 
explains Argentine relegated position in the international comparisons appraised in 
Section I. 
Logically, the question regarding how to revert this innovative duality within domestic 
tradable sector makes itself present. In this regard, successful studied local experiences 
reveal that a strategy to increase innovation in (medium)high-tech manufacturing 
activities and apple and beef production should have two components. On the one side, 
a macroeconomic context that affects favorably Argentine tradable firm’s profit margins 
constitutes a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a strong innovative 
dynamics in mentioned firms. 
On the other side, the study of the soybean case, in particular, and other successful 
innovative activities, in general, provide evidence regarding microeconomics factors 
required to complement macroeconomics in order to boost innovative investment within 
domestic agriculture and industry. Specifically, the former reveal that innovation is 
                                                          
33 This segment’s innovation is also not observed by R+D based international comparisons, as these 
firms’ innovate primarily through the adoption of exogenous knowledge incorporated in inputs and 
machinery. 
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usually not an individual (and frequently incremental) behavior’s result, but a collective 
processes’ consequence (Yoguel et al, 2006). In studied experiences, the own agents’ 
(farmers, suppliers, clients and private organizations) coordination was enough to 
promote innovation. Contrarily, in (medium)high-tech manufacturing activities and beef 
and apple production, firms have not been able to surpass obstacles by themselves and, 
therefore, State’s presence becomes imperative to tackle the most severe innovative 
restrictions. 
As weak funding constitutes innovation’s most relevant hurdle in Argentina, 
Government’s policy’s main objective should be to resolve said obstacle. In this respect, 
international comparisons reveal that credit access does not operate like the fundamental 
impediment for other countries’ investment (Figure IV.1). Indeed, 19% of Brazilian 
industrial SMEs received public funding during 2001-2003, mainly by means of their 
national development bank (BNDES) and other governmental institutions (Banco de 
Brazil, Caixa Economica Federal and Banco del Nordeste). Also, governmental 
financing reached between 25% and 45% of European innovative manufacturing SMEs. 
In notorious contrast, only 13% of domestic industrial SMEs received public funding 
between 1998 and 2001, mainly as a result of Banco Nacion’s and FONTAR’s 
(Argentine Technological Fund) loans. 
FIGURE IV.1. 
INNOVATIVE INDUSTRIAL SMES THAT HAD ACCESS TO PUBLIC 
FUNDING. 1998-2000. 
As a share of total innovative industrial SMEs: 











(*) Brazilian data is from the period 2001-2003. 
(**) Argentine data is from the period 1998-2001. 
Source: Based on data from Indec (2003), IBGE (2005) and Eurostat (2004). 
As this international comparison demonstrates, the necessary increase in innovation’s 
funding should be heavily assisted by the public sector, especially through FONTAR’s 
funds’ expansion. Simultaneously, the rest of the most relevant Argentine innovative 
hurdles should be addressed. As it is not the authors’ purpose to detail an exhaustive 
policy, some major key working lines should include partially subsidizing onerous 
innovative projects with strong technological and social externalities, reducing 
investment’s private cost, and strengthening National Technological Institutes (INTA -
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Agricultural- and INTI - industrial), in order to diminish innovative risks and return 
periods. 
Finally, it is important to address that the former policy should be associated with the 
achievement of required results in specified terms, especially regarding technological, 
export and, even, qualified employment levels. In this respect, Southeast Asian 
experiences, especially in Korean Republic’s case, demonstrate that (medium)high-tech 
sector’s development was enticed by the prevalence of reciprocity rules related to 
innovative and exporting dynamics in a defined period (Amsden, 1989). 
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